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This lecture has four main themes, which I will summarize at the outset:
1) Work on local commons issues -  irrigation in Nepal or mountain 
pastures in Switzerland -  is characterized by conflicts of views that are 
remarkably similar to conflicts over issues of global interdependence -  in the 
environmental field or elsewhere. In both cases, a pessimistic, “inexorable 
conflict” school is pitted against a conditionally more optimistic, 
“institutionalist” school of thought. These similarities seem to be due to 
structural similarities in the nature of the problems.
2) Successful institutions do exist, both with respect to local commons 
issues and on international questions, which do rely on centralized coercion. 
Instead, they foster procedures and practices that can be summed up in a 
phrase: “making reciprocity work.”
3) When we look closely at the conditions for effective institutional action, 
however, we see that reciprocity is not enough. It is necessary but not 
sufficient. If the world environment is to be protected, there also needs to be 
enough concern -  political mobilization -  and sufficient capacity to act, what 
is variously called “social capital” or “national capacity.”
4) Hence, the quality of international environmental protection efforts 
during the next decades will depend on creating concern, capacity, and the 
conditions under which reciprocity can thrive.
I will proceed by first discussing two controversies about conflict and 
cooperation in different fields of political science: the study of common 
property resources (CPRs) and the analysis of world politics. I will argue that 
the controversies are structurally similar. In Part II, I will put forward the 
proposition that institutions can successfully deal with issues of common 
property, and of global interdependence but only on condition that conditions 
favor the effective operation of reciprocity. Hence, in Part III I turn to the 





























































































I. Two Controversies about 
Conflict and Cooperation
Two literatures discussing conflict and cooperation -  those on common 
property resources (CPRs) and international relations -  are both character­
ized by a sort of dualism of thought. On one side are those who see conflict as 
endemic, for structural reasons, apart from human agency; on the other, 
those who argue that well-designed institutions can promote cooperation, 
under certain conditions.
In the CPR literature, this controversy is epitomized by the differences 
between the view of Garrett Hardin (1968) and Elinor Ostrom (1990). For 
Hardin, when social stability enables population growth to occur, “the inher­
ent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy”, as a result of a 
contradiction between individual incentives and aggregate welfare. Each 
herdsman grazes too many animals on the commons because he only bears a 
small fraction of the negative externalities thus created. “Each man; is locked 
into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit -  in a world 
that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursu­
ing his own freedom in a society that believes in the freedom of the com­
mons” (Hardin 1968: 1244-45). For Hardin, the only plausible answer is 
coercion; governmental power exercised to protect the environment and limit 
population size.
In contrast to Hardin's deterministic view, in her empirical work Elinor 
Ostrom finds a number of arrangements for governing commons that have 
lasted for centuries, such as mountain villages in Switzerland and Japan, and 
irrigation institutions in Spain and the Philippines; and she finds others that 
have persisted at least for decades. So she establishes a possibility theorem for 
self-governance: that “horizontal ordering” is possible. She does not refute 
the general tendency toward rent dissipation and the fragility of commons 
institutions that Hardin identifies -  but her possibility theorem leads her to 
ask a different question: “under what conditions can successful 
self-governance occur?”
In the international relations literature, Kenneth Waltz makes an argument 
about the effects of what he calls “anarchy” in international relations -  lack of 
common government -  that is very much like Hardin's argument, with com­




























































































“Each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges 
best. Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because 
there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of 
interest that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of 
anarchy.” (Waltz 1959: 238)
Waltz adds a twist missing in Hardin: the actors potentially threaten one 
another directly, not merely by appropriating common resources:
“When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states 
that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are 
compelled to ask not, 'Will both of us gain?' but 'Who will gain 
more?'... Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does 
not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use 
its increased capabilities” (Waltz 1979: 105).
So for Waltz, conflict is endemic -  intrinsic to the structure of world politics. 
He has less faith in coercion than Hardin does, but an equally bleak view of 
the consequences of “anarchy.”
Yet those of us who study institutions and cooperation in world politics 
have found many institutions that in fact facilitate interstate cooperation for 
mutual gain -  from GATT to the Montreal Protocol on Protection of the 
Ozone Layer (Haas, Keohane, Levy 1993). Such conflict should not be 
equated with harmony: on the contrary, it arises out of conflict and coexists 
with it (Keohane 1984). States, individuals, and groups quarrel about which 
values should be given highest priority, who should pay, and who should ben­
efit. Sometimes institutions fail, or are at least quite ineffective (Keohane and 
Levy 1996). Yet, like Ostrom, against the inexorable/inevitable conflict the­
ory we can establish possibility theorems: sustained and significant coopera­
tion among states does occur, and it occurs through institutions.
What I want to point out here is that these controversies are structurally 
similar. Hardin and Waltz identify real dynamics of over-use and conflict, 
which fundamentally affect actors' behaviour. Yet in both domains claims of 
inexorability and inevitability seem problematic in light of the empirical evi­
dence, since cooperation sometimes takes place. That is, cooperation takes on 
different values at different times, rather than always approximating zero. It 




























































































In both cases, the key to cooperation seems to be the ability of actors to 
make credible commitments, which requires institutions that constrain their 
behaviour. The crucial analytical question in both cases is: under what 
conditions can institutions be created that make it possible for actors to make 
credible commitments, as well as to coordinate their behaviour -  hence to 
cooperate?
This question is at the center of international relations theory, and it has a 
normative as well as analytical content: How is humanity to escape the “trap” 
outlined by the “tragedy of the commons” and by incentives for international 
conflict? How can we, through conscious effort, avoid Malthusian impover­
ishment, environmental degradation, and even a new, nuclear round of 
military conflict that might destroy the prospects for fulfilling human life 
more thoroughly, and certainly more quickly, either impoverishment or 
degradation? A social science not seeking answers to these questions would be 
a social science of irrelevance or despair.
II. Successful Institutions and 
the Operation of Reciprocity
We can start to identify causes of variation in cooperation by looking at 
some of the successful institutions that have been identified. These institutions, 
of course, are not representative; a rigorous analysis would have to begin 
with the explanatory variables of theory, then see what phenomena are asso­
ciated with different configurations of such variables. Yet for the purposes of 
this lecture, successful institutions may tell us something about the processes 
that are associated with cooperation, on commons problems or issues of 
international politics. We are so familiar with the failures -  instances of 
resource depletion, trade conflict, and war -  that it may broaden our thinking 
first to reflect on some successes. From these experiences we can extract 
some common principles of successful institutions, which center on the 
concept of reciprocity’. Such an analysis can provide us with hypotheses that 
could be tested by empirical work.
Some of Ostrom's most telling examples of successful cooperation are 
from mountain villages in Switzerland and Japan, which successfully managed 
their commons for centuries. The Japanese villages had elaborate rules for 




























































































Torbel, Switzerland, a rule dating from 1517 AD provides that “no citizen 
could send more cows to the alp than he could feed during the winter” 
(Ostrom 1990: 62). In this village, cows are counted at the beginning of the 
season and fines are imposed for those who break the rules.
On the international relations side, despite premature announcements of its 
death, GATT has been a highly successful institution, which has promoted 
lowering of tariffs; reductions in non-tariff barriers; and dispute-resolution 
among major trading countries. GATT has developed increasingly elaborate 
rules for trading behaviour, but at least until now has not had any centralized 
system of enforcement. Enforcement is by reciprocity: authorized retaliation 
by trading partners whose interests have been damaged.
In thinking about the institutional attributes that are associated with success, 
I have been impressed by a remarkable agreement between Ostrom's obser­
vations about local commons questions and my own work, and that of other 
colleagues, about international relations. Five institutional attributes seem 
particularly important:
1. Clearly defined institutional boundaries: knowing what is covered, 
what is not.
2. Broad participation in rule-making.
3. Systematic arrangements for monitoring.
4. Graduated sanctions for violation.
5. The availability of conflict-resolution mechanisms.
What these features do is to make regulation by reciprocity feasible. Although 
ostrom derived them inductively from her studies of local commons issues, 
they apply to international institutional arrangements, such as GATT or the 
Montreal Protocol on Depletion of the Ozone Layer.
If reciprocity is so important, what does it mean, and how does it work? 
Reciprocity is an ambiguous term -  like the “balance of power”, it can easily 
come to mean everything or nothing. As I. L. Claude commented thirty years 
ago: “Balance of power is to writers on international relations as 'a pinch of 
salt' is to cooks; 'stellar southpaw' to baseball writers; and 'dialectical mate­
rialism' to Marxist theoreticians” (Claude 1962: 12). The most general 
meaning of reciprocity refers to its essential features of contingency and 
equivalence. It refers to: “exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which 
the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of others in such 




























































































In specific reciprocity, the identities of the other players are known: each 
player responds in kind to actions of the others in a way known as “tit for 
tat.”
Practicing specific reciprocity can affect the incentives of players in a way 
that promotes cooperation. In a sense, it can create gains from political 
exchange, analogous to the gains from economic exchange identified by Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo. Those who care about environmental harm in other 
states can attempt to make it worthwhile -  positively or negatively -  for other 
governments to do something about it. “Leaders” can prompt “laggards” to 
act -  without the necessity for coercive, centralized government. The fact that 
others' cooperation is contingent on one's own provides incentives even to 
reluctant actors to maintain cooperation (Axelrod 1984). This does not mean 
that reciprocity always works effectively: conflicts of interest and values may 
be too great, or the expectation of future gains from cooperation may be 
reduced by uncertainty about whether the game will continue. But chances for 
cooperation are better than if each state faces the opportunity to be a 
“free-rider” -  not to contribute to a collective good while others do so -  
without the prospect of punishment.
Examples of specific reciprocity in international relations are common, on 
trade and environmental issues, bilaterally and multilaterally. In the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), states not abiding by GATT rules 
do not necessarily get the benefit of mutual concessions negotiated by GATT 
parties. The United States, as the largest trading partner, employed reciprocal 
strategies in such sectors as steel, autos, and wheat flour (Rhodes 1993). States 
not adhering to the ozone accord could have faced trade sanctions (Parson 
1993; Desombre and Kauffman 1996).
Reciprocity can have effects on domestic politics, even without formal 
derogations of sovereignty, since interests faced with adverse reciprocity may 
press for more cooperative policies for fear of retaliation. Exporters may 
oppose protection more vigorously than they otherwise would, and multina­
tional firms in import-competing industries may not demand protection for 
themselves (Milner 1987). So for these reasons, reciprocity is a powerful 
practice. It is often employed by states, and sometimes has identifiable effects.
However, specific reciprocity encounters a number of serious problems in 
practice. Robert Axelrod (1984: 138) points out that “the trouble with TIT 
FOR TAT is that once a feud gets started, it can continue indefinitely.” Fur­




























































































tive effects cooperation when strategies of reciprocity are employed 
(Signorino 1995). When more than two actors are involved, problems multi­
ply. There is a second-order collective action problem: who is to enforce 
rules, when enforcement is costly and unrewarded? (Ostrom 1990). And as 
the history of international trade politics shows, when strict specific 
reciprocity is employed, each bilateral deal may render earlier bargains obso­
lete, insofar as the value of a particular concession depends on others not 
receiving it (Keohane 1986: 17-18).
These problems can to some extent be ameliorated by appropriate institu­
tions, which provide information, establish norms that provide incentives to 
follow and enforce rules, and set up arrangements for the resolution of dis­
putes. But for these institutions to work smoothly, they may need to be com­
bined with practices of diffuse rather than specific reciprocity. Diffuse 
reciprocity means that actors comply with general norms in the interest of 
producing a joint benefit, but without expectation of specific rewards or pun­
ishments. Unconditional most-favored-nation treatment in trade -  automati­
cally extending benefits of reductions in trade barriers to any members of a 
club -  is a prominent example of diffuse reciprocity. Many environmental 
agreements such as those on climate change also have this feature: a set of 
rules prescribing behaviour is established, with the understanding and pro­
nounced noncompliance could lead to re-evaluation, but without making 
receipt of benefits contingent on specific reciprocal action.
Diffuse reciprocity has significant benefits, which are the obverse of some 
of the costs of specific reciprocity. There is no need for a complicated 
“adding-up” of benefits and contributions, which complicates multilateral 
cooperation (since there is rarely agreement among countries on these issues). 
Under diffuse reciprocity, problems of feuds and noise inhibiting cooperation 
do not arise. And when communities really form, as in some of the villages 
discussed by Ostrom (1990), norms become widely accepted and internalized, 
which lowers enforcement costs.
Unfortunately, however, actors practicing diffuse reciprocity can be 
exploited. So in the absence of strong norms of obligation (as in small com­
munities) diffuse reciprocity is unstable. Hence overall patterns of diffuse 
reciprocity typically have to be maintained through the sanctions of specific 
reciprocity. As in the GATT, when reciprocity works in multilateral rela­
tions, diffuse and specific reciprocity work in tandem, each to some extent 




























































































III. Creating and Maintaining Conditions 
for Reciprocity to Work
How can reciprocity be made to work? Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom 1995, ch. 
6) tells an interesting illustrative story. In Nepal, much agriculture employs 
irrigation. Since water runs downhill, each irrigation system has “head- 
enders” and “tail-enders.” Head-enders get the water first. The political 
problem this raises is: when the marginal value of additional units of water is 
greater than zero, why should one expect head-enders to provide any water at 
all to tail-enders?
The answer has to lie in reciprocity. What can the tail-enders provide in 
return -  what is their bargaining chip? With traditional irrigation technology, 
canals and waterworks require continual and extensive maintenance; hence the 
head-enders need the tail-enders provide labour to maintain the irrigation 
works. Tail-enders therefore play a reciprocity strategy: they provide labour 
contingent on receiving a prescribed share of the water.
Now comes the irony. Since the 1950s, the World Bank and other agencies 
have been building modem irrigation works in Nepal. Now the head-enders 
do not need the labour of the tail-enders; hence they grab all the water. The 
results are inefficient overall, since the marginal productivity of the water 
declines after some point; but from their point of view, such a strategy makes 
sense, since the marginal productivity of the additional water is greater than 
zero. Under these conditions, the tailenders dry-farm and do not work on the 
irrigation works. The consequence is that the modem irrigation works have 
lower productivity than the old-fashioned one. Ostrom’s data (Ostrom 1994: 
149) show that farmer-managed systems (with the old technology) have 
higher productivity than agency-managed systems (which employ the modern 
technology). The lesson is that both scholars and practitioners need to pay 
attention to “social capital” -  the capacity of people to cooperate with one 
anther -  as well as physical capital, since social capita! is at the basis of the 
effective operation of reciprocity, hence cooperation (Putnam 1993).
At the global level, successful institutions also need to be consistent with 
incentive systems that produce reciprocity. Two examples illustrate this point.
In the early 1980s, public concern about acid rain increased sharply in 
Europe, especially in Scandinavia and Germany. Agreements that had origi­




























































































the Soviet bloc and the West, became principal vehicles for substantial reduc­
tions in sulphur dioxide emissions between 1980 and 1989 -  to levels that 
were 58% below projections made in 1981. For some -  not all -European 
countries the international agreements made a causal difference, through 
increasing knowledge about domestic damage or as a result of linkages among 
issues (Levy 1993: 114-119). Here is an example of the operation of diffuse 
reciprocity -  embodied in norms for sulphur dioxide reductions -  buttressed 
by specific reciprocity, in the form of linkages drawn by powerful states to 
other issues.
In 1987 a famous agreement -  the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer -  was signed, and it has since been strengthened 
repeatedly, although only two years earlier it had been impossible to reach 
more than a framework agreement without specific content. The Montreal 
Protocol called for 50% cuts in production of basic chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFC's) by the year 2000; the rule now is that rich countries must totally end 
their production this year. The rules of the Montreal Protocol reflect diffuse 
reciprocity: general standards of behaviour are established. These standards 
are different for rich and poor countries: poor countries are given longer 
time periods for phase-out and provided with financial aid. But diffuse 
reciprocity is also buttressed by trade sanctions against violators. The finan­
cial transfer institutions have been set up and are working, although it is 
probably too early to be sure of their overall effectiveness (DeSombre and 
Kauffman 1996).
In general, effective international institutions seem to depend on three 
conditions, which my colleagues and I have elsewhere dubbed the “three C's”: 
1) sufficient concern on the part of publics and governments about environ­
mental problems; 2) a benign contractual environment -  institutional 
arrangements in which reciprocity can work; and 3) sufficient national 
capacity to take effective environmental action (Haas, et al. 1993).
The importance of international institutions, and the conditions of concern, 
contracting and capacity that affect their operation, can be illustrated by 
looking not just at international environmental successes but also at failures. I 
will raise two examples from Eastern Europe: environmental clean-up 
(mostly air and water pollution) after 1989, and attempts to reduce reliance 
on unsafe nuclear power plants in the area.
Descriptively, the picture is not a pretty one (Connolly, Gutner, Bedarff 




























































































Eastern Europe is low -  not more than 10% of requirements come from 
international action, which totals only on the order of $2 billion. Estimated 
needs run in the many tens of billions. Local governments in Eastern Europe 
have given these issues relatively low priority. Donors “tie” their aid so they 
get a large share of the benefits -  consultancies, equipment sales, and the like. 
And the most serious problems are often ignored -  local air pollution, for 
example -  in favor of transboundary problems. National capacity is lackina.
Analytically, the “garbage can” model of organizational decision-making 
devised by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) fits the evidence best: the various 
international organizations have ready-made “solutions” that look for prob­
lems. Solutions drive problems rather than vice versa.
Similar patterns are evident on the more specific problem of East Euro­
pean nuclear safety (Connolly and List 1996). Already in 1990, Soviet-built 
reactors were identified as dangerous -  and poorly run. Cost estimates ran 
around $20 billion. Not only has funding been relatively low -  on the order 
of $1 billion -  but more important, the nuclear industry has defined the 
problem. Hence there has been an emphasis on providing more power, rather 
than on reducing demand for power in what is a very wasteful system. 
Finally, both public concern and national capacity to run plants safely has also 
been lacking in Eastern Europe. These governments have not made nuclear 
safety a priority, although some international programs have made a positive 
impact on national capacity to operate nuclear plants. Ironically, international 
action has sometimes provided technical “fixes” that make the nuclear danger 
somewhat less severe in the short run at the cost of providing incentives for 
governments to keep dangerous plants going longer. Hence reciprocity takes 
the perverse form of the East Europeans agreeing to incremental, partial 
action by the West to make their nuclear plants somewhat safer, in return for 
an absence of real pressure for fundamental change.
Analyzing ineffectiveness reinforces the significance not only of reciproc­
ity and institutions that facilitate it, but also of concern and capacity. Some 
combination of specific and diffuse reciprocity is a necessary condition for 
effective international environmental action, in a world still characterized by 
sovereignty and state authority. But the channels of reciprocity can carry 
pollution as well as efforts at clean-up: domestic political mobilization on 
behalf of environmental goals -  what I have called “concern” -  is essential if 
the channels of reciprocity are to have environmentally benign effects. So is 
national capacity to implement what is agreed upon. When any one of them is 





























































































In concluding, I want to move from research-based findings to some more 
speculative arguments about the effects of the end of the Cold War on the 
ability of states to deal with international environmental issues.
One could argue that the Cold War created the willingness to work to­
gether in the West, with less concern than otherwise about specific reciproc­
ity, much less about relative gains. The United States needed its allies more, 
or thought it did -  like the “head-enders.” The allies certainly needed the US 
more. Hence the Cold War in effect created social capital. As long as the US 
took leadership, others had incentives to follow even if they weren't totally 
persuaded. Sovereignty became a secondary value, subordinate to some extent 
to security or even to prosperity.
So we can ask: After the Cold War, will we see a decline in the conditions 
for the operation of reciprocity or an increase in concern about sovereignty?
With respect to reciprocity, patterns of dependence will indeed change, 
hence the underlying configurations of power and interests on which interna­
tional institutions depend. Undoubtedly, therefore, institutions will change, 
sometimes dramatically. But effective international institutions in the foresee­
able future will continue to be built not on the model of world government 
but on increasingly complex and multi-level forms of reciprocity. Hence, 
creating and maintaining the conditions for reciprocity, and a context of con­
cern and capacity in which it can operate, will be crucial for international 
environmental protection well into the next century.
With respect to sovereignty, I think that the costs of seeking to maintain 
extensive freedom of action without acceptance of legal and institutional con­
straints will continue to be very high. We live in a world of extensive eco­
nomic interdependence, which forces governments to make continual trade­
offs between maintaining their own operational sovereignty -  legal freedom 
of action -  and having more control over others' actions. Growing in­
terdependence means that control over others' actions becomes progressively 
more important, relative to the value of maintaining one's own legal freedom 
of action. Hence, as long as economic and ecological interdependence grows, I 
do not expect the demand for sovereignty to make a great comeback among 




























































































To return to my original theme, to Hardin, Waltz, and Ostrom: there is no 
inexorable “tragedy of the commons”, or of “anarchy in international rela­
tions.” There is the potential for tragedy -  many opportunities to find it. But 
the fault lies not merely in our stars -  or in the structure of the situation -  but 
also in ourselves. We should understand the potential tragedy, but also 
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